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accepted as sufficient proofY3s It seems likely, especially in view of the fact
that the KVOS case may well be an exceptional one, decided on jurisdiction
to avoid settling a controversial question on the merits,50 that the Supreme
Court will sustain in general the more liberal attitude toward proof in private
injunction suits- reserving always the right to use the flexible standards to
restrict jurisdiction over particular sorts of private injunction which have
taken on public importance. The Court thus appears to have worked out an
instrument which, although it may leave litigants in particular cases somewhat
in the dark as to their prospects of gaining admittance to the federal courts,
is well adapted to supporting the Congressional policy toward federal juris-
diction.
FIFTY YEARS OF SHERMAN ACT ENFORCEMENT
ALMOST fifty years after the passage of the Sherman Act, the President
has reported to Congress that protection furnished by the anti-trust laws is
so negligible that it renders the system of free private enterprise still virtually
untried.' In some industries price policies have been controlled by a few
large corporations; in others, trade associations have lent a comparable rigidity
to trade practices and terms of sale.2 The anti-trust laws, for a number of
reasons, have failed utterly in application. Yet it is again the opinion of
many critics, after the temporary experiment with N.R.A., that rigorous en-
forcement of the Sherman Act, if it can possibly be achieved, is vital to the
preservation of the national economy.3 The purpose of this Comment is not
58. General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 29 F. Supp. 102 (S. D. W. Va. 1939); Calvert
Distilling Co. v. Brandon, 24 F. Supp. 857 (W. D. S. C. 1938) ; Indian Territory Oil &
Gas Co. v. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co., 95 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938),
cert. denied, 305 U. S. 607 (1938). Cf. James Heddon's Sons v. Callender, 28 F. Supp.
643, 645 (D. Minn. 1939), where the court, although citing the burden of proof rule,
accepted plaintiff's allegation of the jurisdictional amount because "no proof of want of
jurisdiction has been offered by the defendant."
59. See Shulman, Book Review (1937) 15 No. CAR. L. REv. 309, ,311, n. 5.
1. N. Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1938, p. 2, col. 8.
2. On concentration of control, see BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) 18; TiPPErT's & LIVERMORE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
CONTROL (1932) 472; Senator O'Mahoney in N. Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1938, p. 30. Oi trade
associations, see SEAGER & GULICK, TRUST AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS (1st ed. 1929)
304.
3. The New Deal shift in policy from industrial cooperation under governmental
regulation to the enforcement of competition was anticipated in The New Deal: Second
Time Round, FORTUNE, Feb. 1938, p. 59; announced by President Roosevelt in his Mes-
sage to Congress, cited supra note 1; realized in the present active enforcement program
and monopoly investigation. For the opinion of one economist, see testimony of Leon
Henderson before the investigating committee, N. Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1938, p. 1, col. 3.
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to weigh the economic soundness of this view, but rather, upon the assumption
that anti-trust enforcement is desirable, to investigate and analyze the failures
of such enforcement in the past, and to suggest improvements in the future.
Any anti-trust program, to escape defeat, must first face the confusion
arising over the definition of monopoly. It is not easy to determine at what
point "industrial efficiency" becomes "industrial empire building", or an
"orderly market" becomes "controlled." 4 Upon this basic uncertainty a case
history has evolved which further obfuscates the tenuous line of conduct
separating enterprisers from monopolists. In the early days of the Sherman
Act, the power derived from any combination was deemed to constitute a
menace per se which Congress intended to proscribe, without any consider-
ation of the benefits which might accrue to the public.5 It was not long, how-
ever, before this literal interpretation of the Act was abandoned as too strin-
gent a circumscription of the enterpriser to serve the public interest. There
gradually emerged the present sophistication of the early rule by which the
dividing line has been shifted toward monopoly and the area enlarged in
which the enterpriser is permitted to operate." Restraints of trade are no
longer condemned by rule of thumb, but today will be tolerated, though they
stabilize competition, provided the stabilization does not impinge "unreason-
ably" upon the public interest.7 Theoretically the public interest will be suffi-
ciently prejudiced by either intent to restrain or restraint as a necessary
result,8 but actually intent appears in some instances to be the sole criterion,
4. These are the phrases used by the President and Department of Justice. See
note 1, supra, col. 4; Department of Justice Public Statement, released Aug. 23, 1933,
p. 9; Jackson and Dumbauld, Monopolies and the Courts (1938) 86 U. or PA. L R .
231, 237; Arnold, Antitntst Laws, Their Past and Future, speech delivered over AVJSV,
Columbia Broadcasting System, Aug. 19, 1938.
5. United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 226 U. S. 61 (1912); Northern Securi-
ties Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904) ; United States cx rel. Griggs v. Chea-
peake & 0. Fuel Co., 105 Fed. 93 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1900). A reappearance of this em-
phasis upon power regardless of use is found in United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S.
26, 57 (1920), and United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927).
6. See dissent by Mr. Justice White in United States v. Freight Asseciation, 165
U. S. 290, 343 (1897) and Mr. Justice Holmes in Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U. S. 197, 400 (1904). Three times rejected, the rule of reason was finally
adopted by the majority. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911) ; United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911). For an indication of the added
burden of proof which this development involved, see United States v. Standard Sani-
tary Mfg. Co., 191 Fed. 172, 181 (C. C. D. Md. 1911).
7. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States (1939) 6 U. S. L. WNrrn 803; Sugar In-
stitute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936); Appalachian Coals, Inc. Y. United
States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117
(N. D. Ohio 1935); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 47 F. (2d) 2S (E. D. Ito.
1931).
8. Maple Flooring Association v. United States, 2o U. S. 563 (1925); United
States v. Reading Co., 226 U. S. 324 (1912). The same alternatives may be expressed
in other ways: either illegal purpose or illegal means will be sufficient to invalidate.
Bedford Co. v. Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37 (1927) ; United States v. Railvmy Em-
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size raising a mere presumption of intent which must be further confirmed
by conduct.0 No express agreement, overt act, or attempt to execute an un-
lawful purpose need be established,10 and circumstantial evidence from which
conspiracy can be inferred is deemed sufficient," but these alleviations in the
burden of proof do not in any respect facilitate the basic problem of definition
after the proof is in.
The enforcement agency, in choosing its method of attack, must achieve
two occasionally contradictory results. On the one hand, that method should
be adopted which will terminate a particular abuse by a particular defendant
and which will frighten into line potential defendants engaged in similar prac-
tices. But since it has still not been determined with a reasonable degree of
certainty what patterns of behavior are within and without the scope of the
Act, the Department of Justice must also select those cases for prosecution
and employ those methods of enforcement, which will afford the judiciary
the greatest opportunity to mark out permissible paths in which business men
may walk. Resort to criminal prosecution, for example, may have considerable
intimidatory effect, but its contribution to a workable definition of monopoly
has been slight indeed. It will be against the background of this dual standard
that each method of enforcement - criminal prosecution, equity decree, and
suit for triple damages -will be examined in turn.
Criminal prosecution was intended to discourage violations by threat of fine
and imprisonment, 12 with an occasional spectacular example as a general warn-
ing to others who might be tempted to offend. However, to obtain the threat
it has been necessary to assume the exacting burden of pleading and proof
that marks a criminal trial. The anomaly of a doubtful crime"' assures the
ployees' Dep't, 283 Fed. 479 (N. D. Ill. 1922). And an illegal plan will make the parts
unlawful. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905).
9. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920) ; Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911); United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226
Fed. 62 (W. D. N. Y. 1915) ; United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 Fed. 502
(E. D. Pa. 1915). For extreme emphasis upon intent to the exclusion of necessary re-
sult, see Albert Pick-Barth Co., Inc. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., 57 F. (2d) 96 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1932).
10. The prospect of injury is enough, without proof that it actually has occurred.
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1926) ; Pick-Barth Co., Inc. v.
Mitchell Woodbury Corp., 57 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932) ; Knauer v. United States,
237 Fed. 8 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); United States v. Whiting, 212 Fed. 466 (D. Mass.
1914).
11. The courts recognize that proof of conspiracy by direct testimony and express
agreement is usually beyond the realm of possibility. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States (1939) 6 U. S. L, WEEK 803; United States v. Ry. Employees' Dep't, 283 Fed.
479 (N. D. Ill. 1922).
12. A $5,000 fine and a year's imprisonment is the maximum penalty for which the
first three sections of the Sherman Act each provide. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C.
§§ 1, 2, 3 (1934).
13. The statute "creates a crime . . . and gives no specific definition of the crime
created." See United States v. Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, 353 (1897) (Mr. Jus-
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prompt application of the technical devices which have always been invoked
for the protection of the accused and the discomfiture of the prosecution.
The indictment must be a model of careful draftsmanship with sufficient clarity
and detail to inform the defendant beyond any peradventure of the particular
infraction charged, and convince the court that the facts, if proven, would
constitute a violation of the law. 114 Doubts as to the meaning of the indict-
ment will be resolved against the Government.1  Although it is enough to
state an agreement, without any overt acts or any degree of successful execu-
tion,' this requirement may be very strictly construed.17 The prosecution is not
required to state every detail of time, place and instrumentality,1 s but careless
omissions and oversights may prove decisive. The slightest duplicity in any
count may leave the defendant uninformed.10 An indictment may be fatally
defective which fails to charge individual defendants as officers or agents in
active control of an accused corporation, for other officials will be presumed
responsible in the absence of any statement to the contrary.
tice White's dissent). Consequently indictments in the language of the Statute were in-
sufficient. See United States v. Patterson, 55 Fed. 605, 63S (D. Mass. 1S93); In re
Greene, 52 Fed. 104, 111 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1892). The courts have found definition
troublesome. See Continental Candy Corp. v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Rfg. Co.,
270 Fed. 302, 304 (N. D. Cal. 1920) ; REPPY, NATioxAL CONEzrENc oN TIE RrATION
oF LAW AN- Busnmss (1931) 112 (dissents in 44r% of the Supreme Court antitrust
cases by 1931).
14. For the prerequisites of an indictment, see United States v. National Malleable
& Steel Castings Co., 6 F. (2d) 40 (N. D. Ohio 1924); United States v. Cowell, 243 Fed.
730 (D. Ore. 1917) ; United States v. American Naval Stores Co., 186 Fed. 592 (C. C. S.
D. Ga. 1909).
15. United States v. Patten, 187 Fed. 664 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911), ree'd on other
grounds, 226 U. S. 525 (1913).
16. Conspiracy is the gist of the offense. Lamar v. United States, 260 Fed. 561
(C. C. A. 2d, 1919); United States v. Norris, 255 Fed. 423 (N. D. Ill. 1918); Knauer v.
United States, 237 Fed. 8 (C. C. A. Sth, 1916).
17. A "plan adopted" for concerted action is deemed sufficient, but a "concerted plan"
is inadequate. United States v. Piowaty & Sons, 251 Fed. 375 (D. Mass. 1917).
18. United States v. Cowell, 243 Fed. 730 (D. Ore. 1917); United States v. Rintelen,
233 Fed. 793 (S. D. N. Y. 1916); United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 Fed.
823 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1906).
19. United States v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 578 (D. Mass. 1912), aff'd, 227 U. S. 202
(1913) (incorporation by reference) ; United States v. American Naval Stores Co., 185
Fed. 592 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1909) (monopolizing and/or attempting to monopolize). Cf.
Knauer v. United States, 237 Fed. 8 (C. C..A. 8th, 1916) (more than one section of the
act); United States v. King, 229 Fed. 275 (D. Mass. 1915) (both conspiracy and actual
restraint).
20. United States v. Pacific & A. Ry. & Nay. Co., 4 Alaska 530 (3d Div. Juneau 1912).
Cf. United States v. Pacific & A. Ry. & Nay. Co., 4 Alaska 685 (1st Div. Juneau 1913).
Individuals must be actively engaged in the conspiracy. 3S STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U. S. C.
§ 24 (1934) ; Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915). The Gov-
ernment would make knowledge of the violation prima facie evidence of active partici-
pation. Dept. of Justice Public Statement, released Aug. 28, 1938, p. 5.
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The Statute of Limitations is one of several protective devices which may
be used upon occasion to shield the accused.2 1 He is also protected against
removal from his own jurisdiction for trial unless probable cause can be
shown to indicate guilt.2 2 Incriminating testimony given in obedience to a
subpoena and under oath will render him immune to criminal prosecution,2a
if he claims the privilege in advance.2 4 The presence of a single grand juror
who is not qualified to act, or a single official who should not properly have
attended the grand jury investigation will void the indictment.25 The proof
must establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to overcome the pre-
sumption of innocence, and facts equally consistent with innocence or guilt
will not be sufficient to sustain a conviction.2 6 Circumstantial evidence will
be inadequate unless it excludes every hypothesis but guilt.2 7  The charge
to the jury 28 and variance between pleading and proof 20 are always available
21. United States v. Great Western Sugar Co., 39 F. (2d) 152 (D. Neb. 1930). If
the conspiracy continues, the Statute is no bar. United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601
(1910), rev'g, 173 Fed. 823 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1909) ; Boyle v. United States, 259 Fed.
803 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919). Cf. Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599, 625 (C. C. A.
6th, 1915), rev'g, 201 Fed. 697, 724 (S. D. Ohio 1912).
22. United States v. Carlisle, 19 F. Supp. 927 (S. D. Texas 1937); United States
ex rel. McGrath v. Mathues, 6 F. (2d) 149 (E. D. Pa. 1925). Defendants in United States
v. National Malleable and Steel Castings Co., 6 F. (2d) 40 (N. D. Ohio 1924), who
finally pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, obtained two-years' delay by requiring the
government to prosecute 14 different removal proceedings. See THE FEDERAL ANn-
TRUST LAWS (1938) 202.
23. 32 STAT. 904 (1903), 15 U. S. C. § 32 (1934) as amended by 34 STAT. 798
(1906), 15 U. S. C. § 33 (1934). Immunity is not conferred upon corporations or wit-
nesses called by the defendant. United States v. Armour & Co., 142 Fed. 808 (N. D. Ill.
1906); United States v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 187 Fed. 232 (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1911). The immunity afforded is not a license for continuation of the conspiracy dis-
closed. United States v. Swift et al., 186 Fed. 1002 (N. D. I1. 1911).
24. United States v. Greater N. Y. Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 33 F. (2d)
1005 (S. D. N. Y. 1929); United States v. Lay Fish Co., Inc., 13 F. (2d) 136 (S. D.
N. Y. 1926).
25. United States v. Griffith, 2 F. (2d) 925 (App. D. C. 1924) (juror employee of
Government, although on disability compensation); United States v. Virginia-Carolina
Chemical Co., 163 Fed. 66 (C. C. M. D. Tenn. 1908) (special assistants to district at-
torney, whose presence was provided for by statute just too late).
26. United States v. American Naval Stores Co., 172 Fed. 455 (C. C. S. D. Ga.
1909) (charge to jury), re,'d on other grounds, Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373
(1913) ; Union Pac. Coal Co. v. United States, 173 Fed. 737 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909).
27. See note 26, supra. Suspicious circumstances are not enough, and business regu-
larity will be presumed. United States v. Buchalter, 88 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937);
United States v. Great Western Sugar Co., 39 F. (2d) 152 (D. Neb. 1930).
28. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913) (charge failed to withdraw certain
means alleged to have been employed by defendants from the consideration of the jury).
29. Brims v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925), rev'd, 272 U. S. 549
(1926). Six years elapsed following the indictment before the original conviction was
finally affirmed. Brims v. United States, 21 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927). See TUE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (1938) 183.
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to extend further the contest on appeal. Real issues are usually lost in these
various rituals of criminal procedure whenever an attempt is made to apply
the sanctions.3 One of the strongest cases on record for criminal penalties
was reversed when the appellate court discovered an uncertainty in the indict-
ment.31 Although the Government has been successful in slightly over half
of its criminal prosecutions, the bulk of the cases won have been without
contest. Convictions actually obtained are outnumbered by those lost upon
the pleadings.32 Fines totalling $3,746,131,' 3 and prison terms usually under
a year have been imposed in 19 cases with 118 individuals affected.3 4 There
have been few criminal prosecutions against large enterprise.3 The tendency
has been to use these sanctions principally against labor, smaller business and
the rackets.
The tremendous burden and infinitesimal return characteristic of a spec-
tacular criminal prosecution has been reemphasized by the recent suit against
the oil companies at Madison, WVisconsin 3 0 The Department of Justice con-
ducted a field investigation for a solid year before instituting grand jury
30. See Hamilton, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Social Control of Business in
HAx DLEa, TE FEDERAL AxnusT LAWS: A Sv.'rrosIvm (1932) 8.
31. The second and third counts alluded respectively to the firms mentioned in the
first count as competitors during the three years prior to the indictment, and thowe men-
tioned therein as competitors before the statutory period began to run, vwhen actually the
first count had merely listed the competitors of the accused in a single group vithut fur-
ther specification. See Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915),
rev'g, United States v. Patterson, 201 Fed. 697 (S. D. Ohio 1912). The court itself made
the segregation at a later point in its opinion. Id. at 627. See T.-Euscu, PLiy A-;D
ETHICS ix BusixEss (1st ed. 1931) 130; Sr.%Gan & GcLtcr:, tip. cit. supro note 2, at 445.
32. 107 victories to 95 defeats gives the Government a slender margin. Defendants
have plead guilty or nolo contendere in 74 instances, about equally divided. 2 3 convictions
have been obtained, while 31 have been lost upon demurrer, quashed indictments, special
pleas, and unsuccessful proceedings for removal. Of the remaining cases lost, 29 were
nolle prossed, 11 dismissed, 19 resulted in acquittal, and 5 jury verdicts %%ere rever ed
or set aside. For a compilation of the cases, see HADLiCx, CRIM!INAL Pf, .ECt:IOrNS tNE-,a
THE AxTI-TRUST AcT (1939).
33. There have been 92 fines in all. Excluding one case in which the maximum set by
the Sherman Act did not apply because defendants were indicted also under anuther la:,
the largest is $360,000 plus $25,000 for costs assessed in United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., Inc-, when defendants pleaded nolo contendere on June 2, 1938. Department of
Justice Public Statement, Released Aug. 28, 1938, p. 10.
34. Sentences in excess of the maximum are accounted for by violations of more than
one section of the Sherman Act, each of which constitutes a separate offense. United
States v. Buchalter, 88 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). Another explanation is indict-
ment under several different acts. See United States v. Gramlich in TRE F.IzRL ANTI-
TRUST LAws (1938) 263.
35. No more than 22 in all, with the prosecution successful in 9. The total fine as-
sessed against the 283 corporate and individual defendants involved was $1,269,800, an
average of $4,487. The only two sentences imposed were suspended or reversed. See Thn
FEDERAL AxTrraUST LAws (1938) 127, 191.
36. The statistics on the Madison case which follow were secured from the Depart-
ment of Justice.
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proceedings. Then for seven months the grand jury heard 138 witnesses
compile a record of 13,584 pages, including 17,801 separate items selected
and photostated from 172 tons of documents received under subpoena. Pleas
in abatement were filed against the first indictments and two more were
returned in substitution. The trial started on October 4, 1937 and lasted
until January 22, 1938. Whether or not the 27 corporate and 46 individual
defendants were guilty of fixing the price of gasoline was soon forgotten
in the maze of technical banter passing back and forth between the court,
prosecutors, and 112 defense attorneys, as 75 witnesses were examined in
turn. The jury listened to 11,000 pages of record, watched the actors perform
the various mysteries, and decided eight hours after receiving the case for
deliberation on each defendant separately, that the 16 corporations and 30
individuals who remained were all guilty. Thereupon the court took under
consideration previously made motions to dismiss, upon which decision had
been deferred, sustained the verdict as to 12 corporations and five individuals
on July 10, granted three corporations and 15 individuals a newv trial, and
dismissed one corporation and ten individuals notwithstanding the verdict.8 7
Thus after almost four years' labor and the expenditure of about $200,000
the prosecution had obtained a $65,000 fine divided among the 17 defendants
who remained after the original 73 had provided $2,500,000 for defense.
The maximum penalties are clearly insufficient to constitute a substantial
deterrent, but although this deficiency might be corrected by legislation, there
is no way to overcome the mountainous endeavor required to secure a criminal
conviction. As long as the offense remains uncertain, the accused will con-
tinue to enjoy the solicitude of the courts88 and the protection of technical
requirements intended to forestall the improvident application of serious
criminal penalties.3 9 Criminal prosecution might be made effective if restraints
of trade could be defined and enumerated in a criminal code. But the count-
less technical devices for mitigating the severity of the criminal sanction make
it impossible to measure the various shades of business conduct against the
37. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F. Supp. 937 (W. D. Wis. 1938). For an
account of the weaknesses which this case reveals in enforcement by criminal prosecution,
see Dep't of Justice Public Statement, released Aug. 28, 1938 (inadequate penalties, cor-
poration held without officials, burden of trial).
38. Civil suit for injunction or dissolution is preferred as less severe. See United
States v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 578, 584 (D. Mass. 1912), aff'd, 227 U. S. 202 (1913). To
couple the stigma of criminality with vague requirements of the Sherman Law is not
considered fair play. See FREuND, STANDARDS OF AmERCAN LEGISLATION (1917) 222;
Kreider, A Brief History of the Growth of Anti-Trust Legislation in the United States
(1934) 7 So. CALIF. L. REV. 144, 179. Yet it may not be feasible precisely to define the
crime. See SwENsoN, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BUsINEss (1924) § 577; Merritt,
What the Anti-Trust Laws Should Be (1930) 147 ANNALS 195, 198.
39. These requirements were devised originally to protect against conviction for
trivial capital offenses. See United States v. Patterson, 201 Fed. 697, 720 (S. D. Ohio




vague standards of the Sherman Law. Consequently no remedy more inap-
propriate for the purpose could have been chosen, because it carries additional
burdens for the enforcement agency to overcome and requires the existence
of that very line between legitimate business operations and restraints of trade
that it was intended gradually to define. The criminal prosecution has little
utility under the present system. It could, however, prove invaluable for the
enforcement of a definite order issued by an appropriate governmental com-
mission if a system were devised for the administrative policing of industry.40
The Sherman Act may also be enforced by civil suit for injunction, disso-
lution, or triple damages,41 but since the Act is primarily a criminal statute,
these later remedies are dependent upon its criminal sections for a statement
of the offense.4 In some cases a similar degree of proof has been required, 3
but a criminal conviction is conclusive in subsequent civil litigation, and
acquittal on a criminal charge does not constitute an affirmative finding of
innocence that will bar proof of civil guilt by a fair preponderance of the
evidence. 45 In civil suits the courts are prone to make light of technical
objections to form,46 and before a petition will be dismissed without a hearing,
it must be clear that no cause of action exists. 47
As might be expected, it has been far easier to obtain a decree than a
conviction.48 Of the 233 suits brought in equity, only 59 have been lost
40. See p. 301, infra.
41. Proceedings in equity are authorized by § 4 of the Sherman Act, and triple
damages by §7. 26 STAT. 209, 210 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§4, 15 (1934).
42. United States v. Patterson, 201 Fed. 697, 714 (S. D. Ohio 1912); United States
i% Swift, 188 Fed. 92, 96 (N. D. Ill. 1911). Equity was an "afterthought" in the enact-
ment of the law. See FREUND, STANDARDS OF AiimicA. LEoIsrLATnO= (1917) 223.
43. See United States v. American Linseed Co., 275 Fed. 939, 941 (N. D. I1. 1921),
rev'd on other grounds, 262 U. S. 371 (1923); United States Y. Reading Co., 183 Fed.
427, 454 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1910), aff'd except as to 65, contracts, 226 U. S. 324 (1912).
"The words [of the Sherman Act] cannot be read one way in a suit which is to end in
fine and imprisonment and another way in one which seeks an injunction." Northern Se-
curities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 401 (1904) (Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent).
44. United States v. Greater N. Y. Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 44 F. (2d)
393 (S. D. N. Y. 1930), aff'd, Local 167 v. United States, 291 U. S. 293 (1934).
45. United States v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 614 (B. D. Mo. 1936).
46. Compare United States v. Reading Co., 183 Fed. 427, 476 (C. C. I. D. Pa.
1910), aff'd except as to 65% contracts. 226 U. S. 324 (1912) with Belfi v. United States,
259 Fed. 822, 828 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919) for the contrast between equity and criminal prose-
cution.
47. United States v. Railway Employes' Dep't A. F. L., 286 Fed. 228 (N. D. Inl.
1923). Defenses in civil actions must be cast in the form of answers or motions to dis-
miss; demurrers, pleas, and exceptions for insufficiency are abolished. Frr.ntu, RuL.Es oF
CIVIL PROCEDURE (1938) Rule 7. The liberality allowed the pleader in equity is set
forth by Mr. justice Holmes in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905).
48. The civil remedy has been more effective than the penal. See KrZrzsn A-D MAY,
THE PuLic CoNraoL oF BusimESs (1930) 20; JoNEs, Tim TnusT Pno nu : n. TUE
UxNiTE STATES (1921) 496. But see B.TEs, THE StoRY oF THE SurEME CouRT (1st
ed. 1936) 230.
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by the Government. However, delay in the institution of suit from ten to
twenty years after consolidation in several important instances has added
materially to the burden of proof.49 In the meantime, combinations have been
permitted to mellow with years until the distinction between industrial progress
and restraint of trade, which may once have been apparent, is all but oblit-
erated. 50 In this respect there has been no escape from the consequences
of the crucial period when most of the trusts were forming, when the Depart-
ment of Justice was less competent and undermanned, the Supreme Court
unsympathetic, and enforcement half-hearted.r' The result has been hard
cases which may or may not have made bad law. At any rate the courts have
been reluctant to disturb a highly effective industrial machine when it appeared
that earlier conditions could not possibly be restored and the attempt would
unduly prejudice both public and private interests.52
Even when courts have been willing to undertake reform, delay has made
it difficult to restrain or dissolve consolidations that have matured before
the corrective has been applied. 3 Standard Oil provides the best example
of the carrying power that will sustain an established combination in spite
of formal dissolution. 54 The habit of cooperation had developed over a long
history0 5 and could not be suddenly dispelled by mere judicial abracadabra.
Although the decree was scrupulously observed, specialization and division
of territories persisted 50 until economic factors attendant upon the war and
49. The following represents the gap in years between the start of combination in a
few important industries and the institution of suit: Powder: 35, Oil: 24, Tobacco: 17,
Shoe Machinery: 12, Glucose: 11, Steel: 10, Farm Machinery: 10, Anthracite Coal: 16.
See LAIDLER, CONCENTRATION IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1931); THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS (1938).
50. Mr. Justice White found it difficult to choose the correct analysis of the facts
from "a jungle of conflicting testimony covering a period of forty years." See Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 48 (1911) ; United States v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
226 Fed. 62, 65 (W. D. N. Y. 1915).
51. BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (1st ed. 1936) 223; Tip,rs &
LIVERMNIORE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 393; TAEUSCII, POLICY AND ETHICS IN BUSINEsS
(1st ed. 1931) 109; JONEs, op. cit. supra note 48, at 441.
52. See United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 452 (1920) ; United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U. S. 32, 45 (1918) ; United States v. American Can Co.,
230 Fed. 859, 903 (D. Md. 1916) ; Hardy, Loose and Consolidatcd Combinatilons Under
the Antitrust Laws (1933) 21 GEo. L. J. 123, 141; Dep't of Justice Public Statement,
released May 25, 1938, p. 9.
53. Although the Government has obtained 14 decrees of dissolution by contest and
two more by consent, few have been able to overcome this initial handicap.
54. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 Fed. 177 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1909), aff'd
with slight modifications, 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
55. Standard Oil Company was organized in 1870, and the trust in 1882, which was
ineffectively dissolved ten years later. STOCKING, THE OIL INDUSTRY AND THE COM-
PETITIVE SYSTFM (1925) 21, 43. When the holding company was formed in 1899, "the
trust had simply hung out a new sign." JONES, op. cit. supra note 48, at 57.
56. See STOCKING, op. cit. supra note 55, at 68-78, 104; JONES, op. cit. supra note 48,
at 447.
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upon the increase in crude oil production gradually drove the segments apart,5
Because there were no similar extrinsic factors to lend support, the decree
against American Tobacco Company5 s has been even less successful. No
expansion in the growth and consumption of tobacco could ensue to offset
the dominance of the successor companies or to encourage the development
of independents.59 The competitive field had been swept clean by the time
the decree was entered, and has since remained barren.
Experience under these two decrees raises not only the question of physical
separation but also the problem of ownership. Distribution of stock in the
divided subsidiaries among the stockholders of the parent company left the
same individuals in control and was no solution at allP Variations in subse-
quent decrees were designed to accomplish a real division of ownership by
a limitation upon the amount of voting stock in separated companies that
might be held by defendant shareholders in the trust, 1 or by a requirement
that properties be sold outright for cash to independents in which officers
and stockholders of the defendant held no substantial interest.m
In some instances a complete prohibition against the sale or distribution
of stocks in subsidiary companies to shareholders in the principal corporation
has been the rule.63 The original decree in United States v. International
57. See SEAGER & GuuIcK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 128; STocKmrG, op. cit. Mspra
note 55, at 62, 104-14; (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 332, 336.
58. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 191 Fed. 371 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911).
59. New concerns have found it impossible to gain a substantial foothold. See Snr-
GER & GuLIcK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 185, 191; Rru o r oF TIE CoMxMIssxo:NrFM oF Con-
PORATION ON THE Tom-cco INDusTRY (1915) Part III, p. 11. The growth of R. J. Rey-
nolds from 1% of the cigarette business in 1913 to 50V. in 1924 is some evidence of com-
petition among the successor companies themselves. See S&,GEn & GtuicK, supra, at
185.
60. See note 54, supra, at 199; note 58, supra, at 422, 426. The American Tobacco
decree reduced the voting power of the 29 individual defendants from about 56% in the
combine to 35% in the successor companies by giving preferred stocks full voting rights,
and enjoined for three years any increase in their holdings secured from individuals out-
side the circle of 29. Id. at 427, 430; SECGER & GumcK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 123,
175; Joicxs, op. cit. supra note 48, at 449, 462, 494; STocKiNc, op. cit. supra note 55, at
48, 53.
61. The 27 individual defendants were permitted to receive only half the stozk to
which they were entitled in voting shares, and could not increase their holdings for a
priod of three years. United States v. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., I D. & J. 195, 209,
204 (1912).
62. Sale of plants wmas to be made "to a person or persons, including corporations,
not controlled by or affiliated with the Corn Products Refining Co., or any of its officers
directors, agents or affiliated corporations, and if such purchaser be a corporation, none
of the defendants, and no officer, director or stockholder of the Corn Products Refining
Co. or affiliated corporations shall have any substantial interest in the stock or other Ee-
curities of such purchaser." See 103 Chron. 1392 (1919 Part 2).
63. See the decree in United States v. Reading Co., 273 Fed. 848, 854 (E. D. Pa.
1921), modified and aft'd, Continental Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 156 (1922). Disso-
lution by transfer to its own stockholders by Union Pacific of shares held in Southern
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Harvester Company met the problem most directly by providing for a division
of business and assets "among at least three substantially equal, separate, and
independent corporations, with wholly separate owners and stockholders."
'0 4
However, in spite of all this precaution, the decrees in question were still
unable to break down the restraints which had been permitted to solidify,
or to restore the degree of competition intended.0 5 Even when the decree is
more successful in achieving its purpose, the result is not quickly and easily
attained. Although "the meat monopoly has been broken","0 the Packer decree
was not finally confirmed until 1932 after twelve years of litigation, 7 and
sixteen years had elapsed in all before substantial compliance could be
achieved. 68 Complex problems of economics and administration involved in
the disposition of large grocery and stockyard interests held it in abeyance.0 D
No reasonable bid has yet been received for the Swift subsidiary engaged in
prohibited grocery merchandising.
Although the difficulty in framing a decree that cannot be circumvented
is important, the current preference for criminal over civil prosecution is also
attributable to the second trial required to enforce compliance after the decree
has been obtained. To prove contempt it must be established with the degree
of certainty required in criminal cases that the act is prohibited by the decree
Pacific was not approved. United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 226 U. S. 470
(1913). The decree was finally satisfied by distributing to its stockholders shares in the
Baltimore & Ohio which had been received from the Pennsylvania for most of the South-
ern Pacific, the rest going to individuals who held no stock in Union Pacific, 1 D. & J.
217 (1913).
64. D. & J. 338 (1914). However, the Government subsequently consented to a more
equivocal modification which reads: "in such manner and into such number of parts of
separate and distinct ownership as may be necessary to restore competitive conditions and
bring about a new situation in harmony with law." 1 D. & J. 340 (1914). The final con-
sent decree entered in 1918 provided for the sale of three lines of harvesting machinery,
and limited the defendant to a single agent in any town.' See CAUSES OF HiGn PRICES Or
FAni IMPLEMENTS (Fed. Trade Comm. 1918) 710. The F. T. C. predicted failure. Id.
at 653-680.
65. See LAIDLER, CONCENTRATION IN A-MERICAN INDUSTRY (1931) 307 (Du Pont);
JENKS AND CLARK, THE TRUST PROBLEM (1929) 46 (Corn Products Refining) ; Comment
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 439, 444 (Reading) ; note 73, infra (International Harvester). The
decree against Union Pacific was probably successful.
66. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 117 (1932).
67. For a history of the litigation, see United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106
(1932); Comment (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 81.
68. Facts as to the present status of the decree were obtained from the Department
of Justice. For the situation at an earlier date, see REPoar ON THE PACKER CONSENT
DECREE (Fed. Trade Comm. 1925).
69. Numerous stays were granted to excuse the failure of trustees completely to
dispose of prohibited interests in stockyards and unrelated lines when the market did not
warrant a hasty disposition. The Swift stockyards were not entirely sold before 1931,
and Armour's not until five years later.
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and constitutes a violation of the Sherman Law. ° Injunctions are in disfavor
because they tend to legalize monopoly by the removal of incidental evils,72
and cannot readily be enforced since the evidence that was by chance avail-
able for proof in the first instance will probably never again be permitted to
exist.72 -Although dissolution involves physical changes that can be more
readily observed than transformations in conduct, the Government faced
somewhat the same situation when it attempted to prove the Harvester Decree
had not restored competitive conditions. A recent study has found Inter-
national Harvester still dominant in farm machinery by 555 ;73 but the
Government was unable at the time of suit to sustain the burden of proof,
and further relief was denied. 74 However, if suit had been instituted against
International Harvester when it was formed in 1902 instead of 1912, and
a decree obtained in 1904 instead of 191S, success would have been more
likely. 75 Instead, there was no challenge until the respective spheres of
enterprise and monopoly were sufficiently blended and confused to repel
enforcement. If it were not for this ex post facto characteristic of the remedy,
equity might well have been a cogent weapon in the service of the law, but
no corrective can be applied to good effect after transgression has progressed
too far. If the incidence of enforcement were upon business practices which
lead to restraints of trade rather than upon the accomplished monopoly, the
suit in equity would not have to contend with a problem of definition
heightened by the inertia of the status quo. Its limited success may be attri-
buted, therefore, to the present scheme of enforcement in general, and not
to any inherent defect in the remedy itself which makes it inappropriate for
the purpose.
70. United States v. Southern Wholesale Grecers' Ass'n. 207 Fed. 434 (N. D. Ala.
1913). Only 6 proceedings in contempt have been instituted. 15 individuals have been
fined $11,500, 5 have been sentenced to a term of 3 months to 3 years, Debs "and others"
received 3 to 6 months, and one a suspended sentence.
71. United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 230 Fed. 522 (W. D. X. Y. 1916). The
early decrees against Aluminum Company of America and Swift & Company were com-
promises with monopoly which did not penetrate beyond the superstructure. See 1 D. & J.
341, 63. For the results see Comment (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 269 (Aluminum); im,=
ON THE MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY (Fed. Trade Comm. 19191 ; Comment (1932) 42 YIaM
L. J. 81.
72. See United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964, 1018 (S. D.
N. Y. 1916); United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 217 Fed. 656, 60 (N. D. Ohio
1914).
73. AGICR-LTurAL EQ vIMaNr AND MAcHINERY INDus-"Ry (Fd. Trade Comnm.
1938) 1023, 1037.
74. United States v. International Harvester Company, 274 U. S. 693 (1927). The
action was brought under clause (e) of the 1920 consent decree which authorized the
Government to petition for further relief in the event competitive conditions were not
restored. Id. at 697.
75. The supplementary petition w-as filed in 1923 and finally dismissed in 1927. For
a history of the litigation see note 74, supra; THE FEDEnxL AN.TITRLtsT L-ws (1933) 129.
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Section Seven, the triple damage clause of the Sherman Act, was designed
to supply an ancillary force of private investigators to supplement the Depart-
ment of Justice in law enforcement. 76 The effectiveness of the triple damage
remedy depended upon the frequency with which prospective monopolists
would be harried by small competitors who were given the power to institute
suit and exact penalties for violation of the Act. However, an examination
of the reported cases discloses that business men have not been at all anxious
to exercise their privilege. There have been 103 suits in all since 1890.77
This figure, when measured against the hundreds of thousands of men in
business, and the extent of corporate consolidation that has been effected by
certain of their number, assumes a comparatively futile insignificance.
The reluctance of the ordinary business man to bring suit upon a violation
of the anti-trust laws may be explained by the gamble which it involves
and the probability that litigation once started will be protracted, costly, and
followed perhaps by retaliation. The normal confusion as to what constitutes
an offense beyond the pale of enterprise is just the beginning. It is not
enough to allege and prove a conspiracy that would suffice for a valid criminal
indictment and conviction."8 The claimant must also establish that by reason
of the unlawful combination he himself has suffered injury."o Although
evidence required to establish violation, injury and damages will be readily
available in certain instances,80 the proof may fall short at violation without
injury to business or property.8 ' Or it may be the plaintiff can show only
76. 26 STAT. 210 (1890) ; 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1934). "It is well known that the main
purpose of the Anti-Trust Act was to protect the public from monopolies and restraint of
trade and the individual right of action was but incidental and subordinate." See Glenn
Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F. (2d) 885, 889 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934). The Federal
Government recently made use of the remedy directly for the first time. Dep't of Jus-
tice Public Statement, released Feb. 20, 1939. The only precedent is a successful suit by a
municipality. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906).
77. Only six of these were instituted before 1907, while 46 of them have been started
during the last twelve years. During the intervening decades, 1907-1916 and 1916-1926,
there were 25 and 26 respectively. The number, then, has been increasing but not to
any considerable extent. The average per year since the Sherman Law was first enacted
is about two, compared with approximately four since 1926.
78. See Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F. (2d) 885, 887 (C. C. A. 4th,
1934) ; Sidney Morris & Co. v. National Ass'n of Stationers, 40 F. (2d) 620, 624 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1930).
79. See United States v. Pacific & A. Ry. & Nay. Co., 4 Alaska 685, 695 (1st Dlv.
Juneau 1913) (heavier than requirements of an indictment); Rice v. Standard Oil Co.,
134 Fed. 464, 465 (C. C. D. N. 3. 1905).
80. Compare Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38 (1904); American Can Co.
v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930) with Alexander Milburn
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 15 F. (2d) 678 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
81. Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F. (2d) 959 (S. D. N. Y. 1929) (loss of
corporate office and salary, and damage to general credit and reputation are not injuries
to business or property within the meaning of § 7); American Sea Green Slate Co. v.
O'Halloran, 229 Fed. 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) (assuming violation, not shown to be the
proximate cause of damage).
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injury without violation in case intent or a connection with interstate com-
merce is not provable8 2 The further stumbling block of speculation when
damages cannot be precisely ascertained has been avoided by defining specu-
lative damages as not clearly attributable to a cause rather than uncertain
only in amount.8 3 Whether triple damages are punitive in nature has been
disputed, s4 but pleading requirements at any rate have assumed the same
protective character that is typical of criminal prosecutions. Not only must
the complaint allege violation, injury and proximate cause,85 but it must do
so with enough specification to warn the defendant of the particular offense
and convince the court that a cause of action has been stated,80 since the
remedy is drastic and must be strictly construed.8 7 The degree of particu-
larity is intermediate between the requirements of a criminal indictment and
equitable bill.88  Protective devices also reminiscent of criminal prosecution
are available to bar recovery. Although it is apparently no longer possible
82. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co. v. Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co., S3 F.
(2d) 979 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) (no intent to restrain) ; Federal Club v. National League,
259 U. S. 200 (1922) (baseball not interstate); Foster & Kleiser Co. v. Special Site
Sign Co., 85 F. (2d) 742 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) (billboard advertising not interstate);
Peterson v. Borden Co., 50 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) (loss by fraud not related
to interstate commerce).
83. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 232 U. S. 555 (1931),
rev'g, 37 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930). Contra: Bauch Mach. Tool Co. v. Mum-
inum Co. of America, 79 F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). Damages are not speculative
because they cannot be exactly calculated. Eastman Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273
U. S. 359 (1927) ; AV. H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 42 F. (2d) 152 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1930). Damages accruing after suit is brought are not recoverable unless the result
of acts done before suit mas commenced. Conn. Importing Co. v. Frankflort Distilleries,
Inc., 101 F. (2d) 79 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
84. Compare Haskell v. Perkins, 28 F. (2d) 222 (D. N. J. 1923) with Hicks V.
Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 87 F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) ; Bauch Mach. Tool
Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 63 F. (2d) 778 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
85. For good complaints, see Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 9th,
1938) ; Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 71 F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; Cleaves
v. Peterboro Basket Co., 54 F. (2d) 101 (D. N. Hamp. 1931); Majestic Theatre Co.,
Inc., v. United Artists Corporation, 43 F. (2d) 991 (D. Conn. 1930). On procedure in
general, see Comment (1932) 32 CoL. L. Ray. 335.
86. Ebeling v. Foster & Kleiser Co., 12 F. Supp. 4S9 (AW. D. Wash. 1935) ; Cilley v.
United Shoe Mach. Co., 152 Fed. 726 (C. C. D. Mass. 1907). But the pleader is not re-
quired to set forth evidentiary matters. Hicks v. Bekins 'Moving and Storage Co., 87 F.
(2d) 583 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937); Ballard Oil Terminal Corp. v. Medcan Petroleum
Corp., 28 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928). Detail is required in pleading damages, not
the "domestic affairs of the conspiracy." Harry Prochaska, Inc. v. Consolidated Litho-
graphing Corp., 51 F. (2d) 362 (S. D. N. Y. 1931); Locker v. American Tobacco Co.,
194 Fed. 232 (S. D. N. Y. 1912).
87. La Chappelle v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 13 F. Supp. 939 (D. Mass. 1936);
Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 200 Fed. 973 (S. D. N. Y. 1912).
88. Monarch Tobacco Works v. American Tobacco Co., 165 Fed. 774, 779 (C. C.
W. D. Ky. 1908) (less than indictment) ; United States v. Metro. Meat Co., 3 Dist. Ct.
of Hawaii 110, 134 (1906) (more than bill in equity).
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to plead claimant's earlier participation in the restraint as a defense,80 the
accused may insist upon a jufy10 and use the Statute of Limitations as a plea
in bar. 91 Requirements of pleading and proof are occasionally eclipsed by
the hazards of normal trial procedure which may withhold a victory almost
won.92 Under the circumstances it is not at all surprising that prospective
litigants hesitate to take the risk.
Those who dared to venture forth have been awarded damages aggregating
$1,270,147.51 in 12 suits out of the total 103. 9 The record is improved by
38 additional suits that were ruled upon favorably by the courts but not
finally determined, and which were probably settled out of court. Assuming
this to be so, the claimant has been to some degree successful in 50 suits
out of 103. The totals are not impressive, and the number in which triple
damages have been actually awarded is so small that for every four years
since 1890 there would be on the average exactly one. Five of these awards
aggregating $799,711.65 have been made during the last twelve years. The
largest of these was awarded in a suit against the Associated Bill Posters
of the United States and Canada, but since the combination had already been
enjoined, the assessment of damages was something of an anti-climax, espe-
cially since the decree was entered in 1916, the suit for triple damages brought
in 1919, and $352,967.67 finally awarded in 1930.94 The same situation is
89. Plaintiff's conduct prior to the time cause of action accrues is immaterial. Conn.
Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 101 F. (2d) 79 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). The
following were distinguished is inapplicable to a situation in which the cause of action
arises after plaintiff's connection with the conspiracy has been severed: Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Blackmore, 277 Fed. 694 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) ; Bluefields S. S. Co., Ltd. v. United
Fruit Co., 243 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 3d, 1917).
90. Fleitmann v. Welsbach Co., 240 U. S. 27 (1916). Private injunction and triple
damages cannot both be obtained in the same suit. National Foundry Co. v. Alabama
Pipe Co., 7 F. Supp. 823 (E. D. N. Y. 1934); Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades
Council, 23 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
91. Seaboard Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 24 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D. N.Y.
1938); Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F. (2d) 885 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
92. Three million dollars were lost when it was decided excerpts from the opinion
of the appellate court remanding a case for new trial, read in the presence of the jury,
might have influenced the verdict. See Bauch Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 79 F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). Although Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S.
66 (1917) has been often cited as the longest triple damage litigation (1903-1917), the
Aluminum suit required 16 years at a cost to all concerned of hundreds of thousands of
dollars. See Comment (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 269, 282.
93. An additional $12,756,245.66 has been awarded by eleven jury verdicts which
were not sustained. Deducting a single exceptional verdict for eight million, there still
remains a sum substantially in excess of the amount actually awarded and confirmed. On
only three occasions did the alleged conspirators emerge unscathed from the jury room.
Apparently a snug harbor awaits the claimant if he can survive the voyage. But see
Young, Who Shall Administer the Anti-Trust Laws? (1930) 147 AxNALS 171.
Most recent manifestation of the jury's beneficence is the $711,932.55 awarded the
Apex Hosiery Company. See N. Y. Times, April 4, 1939, p. 1, col. 5.
94. W. H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 42 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
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presented in the Eastman Kodak case,05 although the success of the decree
obtained is rendered circumspect by an extremely litigious record. 0 In any
event the $23,743.98 finally awarded after twelve years of litigation could
not possibly have deterred a corporate defendant with an earned surplus of
$3,335,419 in 1927, the year of the award.0 7 The award of $10,500 against
American Cangs with an earned surplus of $7,627,6202 was also mathemati-
cally insignificant, but in that case the publicity afforded by disclosure that
the defendant was playing favorites in face of public announcements to the
contrary must have impaired the standing of American Can with all the
customers against whom it had discriminated and compelled a return to fair
trade practices. In the remaining cases, the damages awarded were in them-
selves a considerable deterrent without the aid of extraneous circumstances.100
However, three successful suits every twelve years constitute no material
assistance to the Government. The outcome of this abortive undertaking to
enforce the laws by private action returns again unerringly to the crux of
the anti-trust labyrinth. Until the offense is more precisely defined, enforce-
ment will be mediocre. The individual, who might do much to enforce the
law, is reluctant to act because he is uncertain whether or not an offense has
actually been committed. The weakness of private suit for triple damages,
like criminal prosecution, is rooted in its demand for that reasonable certainty
in the law which it was intended itself gradually to supply.
The distinction between monopolists and enterprisers has not been clarified
by fifty years' administration of the anti-trust laws.10' The only evidence
of success in this direction has been the increasing popularity of consent
decrees,'102 explained by a general preference to accept the inevitable when
95. Eastman Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U. S. 359 (1927).
96. The petition was filed in 1913, and the decree of dissolution finally entered in
1921 with supplementary decrees following in 1926, 1929, and 1935. See TnE FzD=nx.
AN-TRUsT LAws (1938) 141.
97. 'Moonys ITNusTm.s (1928) 2421.
98. American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930).
99. .MOODY'S INDUSTRIAI.S (1931) 1007.
100. $195,000 against defendants with an earned surplus of $158,780. Story Parchment
Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555 (1931) ; Moody's Industrials (1932)
107,2321. $120,000 against an earned surplus of $710,929 in 1923, and a deficit of $45,879
in 1929, the last years in which defendant was listed. Albert Pick-Barth Co., Inc. v.Mitchell Woodbury Corporation, 57 F. (2d) 96 (C. C.A. 1st 1932) ; Meon's I:us S
(1931) 2978.
101. See Jackson & Dumbauld, Monopolies and the Courts (1938) 26 U. or PA. L.
Rn-. 231, 236, 256; Jackson, Should the Anti-Trust Lazs Be Rezdsed? (1937) 71 U. S. L.
R.y. 575; Young, Who Shall Administer the Anti-Trust Laws? (1930) 147 AinA=
171, 177.
102. Consent decrees now outnumber contested suits in equity, 117 to 116. A com-
parison by decades from 1910, with the prior twrenty years as the first period, indicates
that this numerical superiority has been progressive. Consent: 4, 37, 65, 11. Contest:
24, 20, 10, 3.
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previous decisions in similar cases indicate that defense would be unavailing.100
However, the present numerical superiority of consent decrees over contested
suits in equity might also be explained by anxiety to escape the ordeal of a
vigorous prosecution with its attendant expense, publicity, delay, and business
disorganization. 10 4 This tendency eases the burden of law enforcement, but
it may be that consent precludes further relief in case the decree proves in-
sufficient.' 0 5 However, in spite of this limited accomplishment in the past,
it is the duty of the Government to enforce the law as enacted, and the
present vigorous program indicates a will to perform. Within the usual
formula of enforcement, with suspicion, threat, and punishment the factors
on which the Government continues to rely, the Department of Justice is
determined to use the methods available to best advantage. The criminal
prosecution is preferred as the most drastic remedy of all, with equity in a
subordinate role, and consent reserved for immediate relief when it does
not appear that punishment can be readily imposed. 10  To facilitate the burden
of proof, emphasis is placed upon economic consequences rather than upon
intent as the essential criterion for the segregation of monopolists from enter-
prisers in an attempt to shift the dividing line back to the position it occupied
in the beginning when all restraints were illegal and monopoly was outlawed
by rule of thumb. 10 7 To avoid another defect that hampers law enforcement,
103. See Donovan, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Anti-Trust Laws
(1933) 46 HARv. L. REV. 885. Striking examples are the recent agreements of Ford and
Chrysler to accept consent decrees in the event the prosecution of General Motors is
successful, and a similar earlier agreement by Remington-Rand to accept any decree
which might be entered against International Business Machines. See Dept. of Justice
Public Statement, released Nov. 7, 1938; THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRusT LAws (1938) 246.
Note 102, supra, is a further indication that consent springs from contest at an earlier
period.
104. See Donovan, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Anti-Trust Laws
(1933) 46 HARV. L. REV. 885, 911.
105. It is not clear whether the Court decided in United States v. International 1Har-
vester, 274 U. S. 693 (1927) that the Government was bound by the consent decree so
long as the other contracting party complied, or simply that the decree was sufficient to
restore competitive conditions. Compare note 104, supra, at 897 and note 73, supra, at 163
with Comment (1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 269, 279. The same question must be confronted
in the current suit against Aluminum Co. of America.
106. Arnold, Fair and Effective Use of Present Anti-Trust Procedure (1938) 47 YALE
L. J. 1294. "I do not deny that by amendment changes might not be wrought upon the
civil procedure which would make me modify my present position." Id. at 1299. Sufficient
changes may be effected by the O'Mahoney Bill, recently introduced in the Senate: (1)
Violation by company constitutes violation by any officer who authorized illegal act, and
knowledge presumes authorization; (2) officer forfeits twice his total compensation for
the period of the violation; (3) company forfeits twice its total net income for the
same period. See 84 Cong. Rec., June 29, 1939, at 11,483.
107. Enforcement is concerned with economics consequences, not state of mind, See
Arnold, Fair and Effective Use of Present Anti-Trust Procedure (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
1294, 1297.
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requests have been made for more men and larger appropriations so that all
complaints can be investigated and all cases brought to trial.10 s
But the present enforcement machinery produces wasteful litigation which
may defer the answer to pressing economic questions from three to twelve
years after suit has actually begun.10 9 Moreover, it seems both impractical
and unwise to attempt a return to the days when all size and power were
deemed to constitute illegal restraints of trade. The Government might more
readily achieve success if the present formula of enforcement centering upon
the punishment of monopoly were replaced by another that would concen-
trate instead upon the conduct of enterprise. This recommendation is in
accord with the steady current of legislation and criticism since the laws were
first enacted, which recognizes that monopoly is the product of unsavory
business morals, and can more readily be checked during the incipient stage
than destroyed upon its maturity.110 The Clayton and Federal Trade Com-
mission Acts were intended to advance the moment of application sufficiently
to direct the impact of the laws against competitive practices which did not
assure fair play and therefore encouraged restraints of trade., 1 Current
proposals represent a further development of this emphasis upon business
ethics as the essence of the monopoly problem.112 They would require the
submission of plans for merger and business cooperation in advance of
execution to a commission for the determination of legality.113 Some pro-
108. "You can't police a country as large as America with a corporal's guard."
Arnold, Anti-Trust Laws, Their Past and Future, delivered over VJSV, Columbia Broad-
casting System, Aug. 19, 1938. See Cummings, The Unsovcd Prolem of .[oopaly
(1938) 72 U. S. L. REv. 23, 25.
109. See RorLFING, BusiNESs AND GoVERx.E.nT (3d ed., 1938) 153; Young, J1ho
Shall Administer the Anti-Trust Laws? (1930) 147 A.\NALs 171, 176, 177. The following
litigations are a few of the most important and prolonged. American Sugar Refining:
12; Reading, and International Harvester: 10; U. S. Steel, and United Shoe Machinery:
9; Eastman Kodak: 8; Corn Products Refining: 6; Du Pont, and Standard Oil: 5;
American Tobacco: 4.
110. See TuEODORE RoosEvzmL: AN AuTomIoGR.APHy (1913) 617-620; Donovan, The
Need for a Commerce Count (1930) 147 ANNALS 138. After serving their purpose,
illegal practices are abandoned and the powerful organization whbich they have created
cannot be touched. See United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 444, 451
(1920) ; United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859, 902 (D. Md. 1916).
111. See McLaughlin, The Courts and The Robinson Patinan Act (1937) 4 Lw &
Co.rz,,'. PRoB. 410, 412; Jones, Historical Dez'elopnent of the Law of Buiness Compe-
tition (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 351, 377.
112. See Dickinson, Anti-Trust Laws and the Self-Regulation of Industry (1932) 18
A. B. A. J. 600; Merritt, W1hat the Anti-Trust Laws Should Be (1930) 147 An::ALs
195, 201.
113. See Butler, Needed Changes in Anti-Trust Law (1930), 147 ANALs 189, 191;
Legis. (1932) 45 HIxv. L. REv. 566. A special court has been recommended, instead
of a commission. See Donovan, The Need for a Commerce Court (1930) 147 ANNALs
138, 143; Young, Who Shall Administer the Anti-Trust Lazes? (1930) 147 An.ALs
171, 177.
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posals would confine the commission to advisory opinions ;114 others would
authorize the issuance of licenses for immunity against triple damages and
criminal prosecution as long as the licensee complies with the terms of his
approved plan of operation.1 5 By this procedure there would be assured a
prompt examination of industrial structure in economic terms" 0 when some-
thing can still be done about it, and an incentive would be offered coopera-
tion among business men and the Government in a mutual undertaking to
eradicate the sources of trade restraints." 7 The present monopoly investiga-
tion will examine various proposals to heighten the effectiveness of the laws.
Although the details cannot be foreseen, it is most likely that a similar plan
for the administrative policing of industry will emerge.
So fundamental a change in the theory and incidence of anti-trust enforce-
ment would probably nevertheless retain the methods that have been con-
sidered above. There would be no need of further, alteration, because the
fault has been not so much with the remedies themselves as it has been with
the general scheme under which they have necessarily been applied. Criminal
prosecution and suit for triple damages were not fitted to bring order out
of confusion. Equity could not operate successfully after the fact. But if
these devices were appended to administrative machinery for anti-trust en-
forcement, the difficulties which have hampered their operation in the past
would be dissolved. The orders of a commission would sufficiently distinguish
the conduct of enterpriser and monopolist to enhance the success of suits for
triple damages and facilitate criminal convictions in those cases where the
orders were disobeyed. Since administrators would act at an early stage in
the development of trade restraints, the effectiveness of the bill in equity would
be increased. The precision and the timeliness which have been lacking would
be supplied. The methods of enforcement have been unable clearly to draw
the line of conduct which the anti-trust laws require, but once a standard is
provided by an administrative system designed to apply the law to particular
situations, criminal prosecution, the bill in equity and the suit for triple
damages should be competent to enforce compliance.
114. See Legis. (1932) 45 HAuv. L. REv. 566, 568. At one time this service was
*performed by the Department of Justice. See Donovan, Sone Practical Aspects of the
Sherman Law (1929) 3 TEmP. L. Q. 343, 350. "That practice is now generally dis-
credited." Dept. of Justice Press Release, July 20, 1938, p. 3.
115. See Podell, Our Anti-Trust Laws and the Economic Situation (1931) 17 A. B.
A. J. 254, 260; Merritt, What the Anti-Trust Laws Should Be (1930) 147 ANNALS 195,
198. A license may not be required. See Comment (1933) 27 ILL. L. Rzv. 671, 676.
116. For the economic approach, see excerpt from President Wilson's address to the
Congress on Jan. 20, 1914 in Donovan, supra note 113, at 139; Young, supra note 113,
at 172. For the traditional legalistic viewpoint, see United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 191 Fed. 371, 376 (C. C. S. D. N.Y. 1911); Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Co. v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 166 Fed. 254, 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1908).
117. The criminal prosecution wouid be relegated to a secondary role. See Butler,
supra note 113, at 191, 193; Merritt, supra note 115, at 198. The spectacular anti-trust
suit may be a thing of the past. See Jackson, supra note 101; Donovan, supra note 103,
at 913.
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